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Abstract 
This pper  examines the uses to which 
Foucault’s work has been put in a 
variety of areas in the social sciences 
The argument is mode that Foumlt’s 
work is ofren used to legitimute 
practices which bear little resemblance 
to the original uncl are frequently 
based on a misunderstunding of his 
inerhod Foucault’s work should not 
be turned into a slogan and them 
inserted within an existing political 
project. Foucault ‘s work invites 
scepticism. rather lhan abgmatic 
belie$ i% argument is illustrated with 
examplesfrom lliscuurse unalysis. 
Itttruiluction 
... veneration of mommetits 
becomes paroc&: the respect fw 
amcieni continuities becomes 
systematic diswciation: the critique of 
the injustices ofthe pasi by a truth heki 
by men in the present becomes the 
&sitwciioti of the man who maintains 
knowledp by the injustice proper to 
the will to knowler2ge. (Foumlt, 1977 
a: 164) 
Michael Foucault is a writer of crucial 
importance in the social sciences, 
where he is regularly represented as a 
rnethohlogical authority figure. Texts 
as diverse as Said’s (1978: 3 tl) 
Orientalism and Beer’s (1983: 268) 
h i t i ’ s  Plots use Foucault as a 
methodological starting point for their 
accounts. It is hard to think of an area 
in the social sciences that has not fdt in 
some measure what, following Burchell 
et ai (1991), we night t a m  the 
Toucault Effect”. For example, he has 
been given as an important 
methodological source for discourse 
& Wetherell 1987), fbc feminism and 
‘post feminism’ (eg Diamond and 
Quiiby 1988; Jordanova 1989). for 
critiques of psychiatric practice (eg 
Miller & Rose 1986), for a potential 
reformulation of psychology (eg 
Henriques et al 1984), and for h t i n g s  
in the history of psychoanalysis (eg 
Forrester 1990). In this paper, we 
dissect statements about Foucault’s 
work and claims about the relevance of 
his conclusions. We draw on examples 
fiom discourse analysis, feminism to 
make the point that Foucault’s work 
can not be inserted unproblematicruy 
into any (or every) existing political 
project. If Foucault is taken Seriously. 
it is necessary to become a sceptic 
perhaps even one of the pyrrhonian 
variety). In addition, we ask whether it 
is legitimate to ground research with 
the kind of ‘moral authority‘ that 
mention bf Foucault’s name, and 
fleeting citation, seems to invoke. We 
conclude by off ing  a view of what 
‘Foucaultian scholarship’ shoukl look 
like, and review the work of those 
authors whose work seems to be the 
most helpfil development of some 
Foucault’s characteristic themes. 
analysis (eg Palker 1990, 1992; Potter 
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Gordon (1990) points out how 
Foucault’s groundbreaking (1961 ) 
Foile et dkraison has been the subject 
of a variety of misreadings and 
misunderstandings, not least because 
many commentators have relied on 
reading the abridged translation. We 
argue that Foile et Cipraison is not the 
only text to suffer the fate of being 
misunderstood; but we add the 
suggestion that the motivating factor 
behind such misappropriations of 
Foucault is more than the unavailability 
of full translations: we also point to the 
desire to subsume Foucault within 
. political projects. Our analysis of these 
misappropriations relies on selecting 
specific examples from the tradition we 
concentrate upon. We use examples 
that are either typical or widely cited, 
and make limited claims about the 
generalisabiity of what we say. 
Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis, which has become 
an academic growth area, is essentially 
the celebration of language-use as the 
most important aspect of human culture 
and the key to understanding human 
interactions. Within psychology, for 
example, it has established itself as one 
of the most self-consciously ‘modern’ 
(or perhaps even postmodern) 
approaches to understanding social 
psychological issues (therefore 
subverting other methodological 
practices within psychology). It is 
claimed, for example, that racism can 
be investigated and pinned down 
(perhaps even remedkd) by 
understanding the language of 
‘discourses’ engaged in by participants 
in social life (eg Wetherell & Potter, 
1992). Within psychology at least, this 
type of research is descended from a 
tradition known as conversation 
analysis (eg Atkinson & Heritage 
1984), which concentrates on a 
microscopic analysis of verbal 
exchanges, focusing attention on tum- 
taking, hesitations, pauses, overlaps, 
tag-questions, and so on, largely 
without commenting on the situations 
within which a verbal exchange took 
place. Discourse analysis adds a (fairly 
non-specific) attention to the context of 
their target utterances, noting political 
and socioeconomic issues (see Potter & 
Wetherell 1987). To establish its 
difference from conversation analysis. 
discourse analysis needs to make a 
display of methodological 
sophistication - which is where 
Foucault so frequently comes in. 
Reference is routinely made to Foucault 
as a methodological inspiration. 
Foucault’s (1972) ‘methodology 
handbook’, ilk Archeolqq of 
Knowledge, is the ‘authority’ for the 
use of the term ‘discourse’. 
Discourse has almost become a 
term without meaning Potter and 
Wetherell, for example, use it to cover 
“all forms of spoken interaction, formal 
and informal, and written texts of all 
kinds” (1987: 7) This use of the term 
can be usefirlly anchored with a paper 
by Ricoeur (1971). in which the 
distinction is made between linguistic 
systems examined in their own right, 
and the uses to which language is put, 
Potter and Wetherell’s approach is an 
attempt to engage in the latter. The 
problem lies in the fact that the term 
‘discourse’ is derived from a (mainly 
French) theoretical tradition which is 
too infrequently examined for its 
internal coherence. While the famous 
French poststructuralists, like Foucault, 
Derrida and Deleuze use the term in 
subtly nuanced and different ways, 
there is also an input fiom theorists 
rather more interested in semiotics, 
such as Barthes (e6 1977). P6cheux (eg 
1982). Serres and Kristeva. Add to this 
the investigations into discourse from 
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the psychoanalytic perspective of such 
as Lacan (eg 1988), Irigaray or Cixous. 
and one begins to see why this ever- 
present theoretical concept is in 
constant danger of lacking any sort of 
specificity. 
Foucault has assumed pride of 
place in this pantheon; it is widely 
assumed that The Archaeology of 
Knowledge is the locus classicus for 
the definition of discourse. However, a 
carehl reading of this text suggests a 
highly specific de f~ t i on  of discourse 
which is a long way from the 
conception of discourse which lies 
behind discourse analysis within 
psychology. Foucault engages in a 
minute dissection of his own 
vocabulary, and says that the analysis 
of the statement as it occurs in the 
archive is his main concern (Foucault 
1972: 79fQ In addition, Foucault 
points out that l~a]rchaeology 
describes discourses as practices 
specified in the element of the archive” 
(1972: 131), the archive being “the 
general system of the formation and 
transformation of statements” (1972 
130). Foucault’s terminology here 
alerts us to the fact that his approach is 
hislwical, although he is (perhaps 
overly) keen to distinguish between 
‘archaeology’ and ‘history’. This 
emphasis is con!irmed when Foucault 
suggests that to follow his ‘method’, 
one is necessarily engaging in 
‘historical’ work, conceived of in his 
own idiosyncratic way: “the 
archaeological description of discourses 
is deployed in the dimension of a 
general history” (1 972: 164). This is an 
important point: if one is engaging in 
work which is Foucaultian, one is doing 
history. It becomes obvious that there 
is something rather strange in scholiirs 
who analyse contemporary verbal 
exchanges claiming Foucault as a 
methodological inspiration: the more 
clear the distance between their own 
analyses and the meticulous positivism 
of The Archaeolqy of Knowle&e 
becomes, the more obvious it is that 
Foucault is being used to establish a 
than as the basis for a rigorous method. 
Are we being unfair to the 
discourse analysts? it might be argued 
that certain methodological tools are 
derived by them directly fiom Foucault, 
such as the suggestion that discourse is 
constitutive: objects of Scientific 
enquiry, and human subjectivity itself, 
are textually constructed. The main 
point here is that there are no stable 
entities beyond the discourse which 
govern a particular formulation. As 
Foucault argues, “the unity of a 
discourse is based not so much on the 
permanence and uniqueness of an 
object as on the space in which various 
objects emerge and are continuously 
transformed... objects [are] shaped by 
measures of discrimination and 
repression, objects [are] differentiated 
in daily practice” (1972 32-33). It 
could be argued, then, that discourse 
analysis has provided a usem extension 
of this fundamental part of Foucault’s 
work. For example, considerations 
given to the construction of the self@ 
racist, egalitarian, monarchist, 
objective, and so on) by discourse 
analysts make the point that the self is a 
highly flexible entity, capable of rapid 
reformulations in response to discursive 
opportunities (for example, in response 
to interView questions). While such 
work may be laudable, it is carried out 
in isolation from the major question 
which Foucault held to be basic to the 
issue: what are the conditions of 
possibility which simultaneously 
promote and inhibit particular 
discursive constructions? This is, of 
course, a question about history, but it 
is also one which is hardly considered 
certain authority and legitimacy rather 
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history is misplaced. Such a rejoinder 
is inadequate. Much of the work in 
discourse analysis involves the 
investigation of relatively novel 
discursive forms: adaptations to 
feminist rhetoric, critiques of academic 
scrutiny, responses to the ‘enterprise 
culture’, as well as recent formulations 
of ‘race’, quantification in medical 
discourse, and ‘nationhood’, for 
example (see Fairclough 1992, Parker 
1992; Potter, Wetherell & Chitty 1991; 
Wetherell & Potter 1992). What is 
missing here is some understanding of 
the rules of formation of such 
discourses. Merely remarking on the 
context of these constructions is only 
one step. That is, while tracing the 
pennutations of such discourse is surely 
interesting, an analysis of the historical 
contingencies that allowed the 
appearance of such novel forms is 
highly relevant to what is attempted in 
discourse analysis. If nothing else, 
Foucault’s historical approach holds 
out the promise of disrupting our 
present certainties, throwing our most 
cherished beliefs into confusion, 
rendering our present strange. What is 
needed is a much more specific account 
of the way in which discursive 
boundaries have emerged. 
Another aspect of Foucault’s 
work that has been incorporated to 
some extent in discourse analysis (but 
without Foucault’s terminology) is the 
thesis of ‘enunciative modalities’ (eg 
1972: 92-96). This is a radical 
extension of the idea that objects are 
constituted by discourse, which relates 
it to the concept of personhood. This 
thesis breaks down the distinction 
between the author of a statement and 
discourse itself it becomes 
problematic to disentangle this 
relationship; an author is positioned by 
discourse, which is in turn defined by 
historical organisation (Foucault 1972: 
52-55); the author is not a 
transcendental subject left unaltered by 
the act of enunciation. Discourse then, 
according to Foucault, “is not the 
majestical unfolding manifestation of a 
thinking, knowing, speaking subject, 
but, on the contrary, a totality, in which 
the dispersion of the subject and his 
discontinuity with himself may be 
determined” (1972: 55). Such a claim 
could be u&ly compared to Burke’s 
rhetorical question: ‘Do we simply use 
words, or do they not also use us?” 
(1966: 6). A watered-down version of 
this thesis appears in discourse analysis 
when it is argued that a person is not a 
holder of racist attitudes for all time; 
rather one is a racist because of one 
statement, but not through the use of 
another. Personhood then, for both 
Foucault and discourse analysis, is a 
function but. again, what is missing 
from discourse analysis is Foucault’s 
sensitivity to the historical organisation 
of the self vague affiliations with the 
theory of the de-centred subject are not 
sufficient to be an addition to 
Foucault’s project of creating “a history 
of the different modes by which, in our 
culture, human beings are made 
subjects” (Foucault 1982: 777). The 
problem here is that discourse analysis 
does not adopt the radical implications 
of this thesis (see Fairclough 1992; 45); 
again, the connections with Foucault’s 
forms of scholarship seem fairly 
superficial. 
When one of us (Soyland) was 
presenting material on discourse 
analysis in Australia, a Radical 
Behaviourist in the audience (for such 
people do still exist) became v q  
interested; here, he was certain, was a 
reassertion of behaviourist principles 
applied to verbal behaviour. Could 
discourse analysis be a form of neo- 
behaviourism? This similasity is worth 
pursuing for the differences it point up 
between discourse adysis  and the 
work of Foucault. From his early work 
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(eg 196l), Foucault was careful to 
remove any discussion of the role of the 
agent (and particularly the role of 
‘great men’) so typical of narratives of 
history, the interest is in the appearance 
of the text, the point at which 
knowledge becomes public; where we 
see accounts of significant individuals, 
these are conceptualised as functions of 
discourse; even the kind discussed in 
Foucault’s (197%) Discipline and 
Punish is relegated to an institutional 
role inscribed within French law. The 
tension, for example, between Foucault 
and psychoanalytic theory is that 
Foucault is not interested in ontology, 
he tells no phenomenological story, he 
does not contribute (directly) to an 
account of the inner workings of the 
individual mind, for him them is no 
attempt to get beyond the discourse to 
consider questions of psychical 
processes. Here there is a similarity 
with discourse analysis insofar as the 
latter makes no attempt to get “under 
the skull”, to fix models of transference 
or cognitive dissonance; even attitudes 
(that topic most readily identified as the 
province of social psychology) are 
deconstructed in terms of discursive 
variability and contradictory 
repertoires. Yet here, too, is a 
similarity with Radii Behaviourism: 
the workings of the mind became the 
speciality of the neurosciences, 
consciousness became epiphenomenal. 
explanations were to be sought in the 
reinforcement history of the organism 
without resorting to inner 
machinations, the observable was the 
only threshold for psychological 
scrutiny. The behaviour of the agent is 
the site of analysis for both discourse 
analysis and Radical Behaviourism (see 
also Parker 1990, 1992). How, then, 
could Potter and Wether4 (1987) 
make good the assertion in their 
subtitle: ‘Beyond attitudes and 
behaviour’? For while it is true that 
they do not carry out observational 
studies of physical movements in 
controlled environments (the hallmark 
of studies in Behaviourism), they have 
merely restricted their attention to one 
aspect of behaviour: language-use. 
With a shift of terminology, it could 
even be claimed that the discursive 
repertoires of discourse analysis are 
responses to particular reintbrcement 
histories; both of these are responses to 
particular aspects of the environment, 
and both disregard any need for the 
organism to minimise any internal 
inconsistency. Potter et al. (1990) 
attempt to amwer this unhvourable 
comparison with Radical Behaviourism 
by stressing their use of the term 
‘interpretative’, yet because. they give 
no account of the agent giving an 
interpretative response (a phenorn- 
enological or cognitive story), they 
remain open to this form of attack; the 
level of any ‘interprdtion’ is only 
judged according to behavioural 
criteria. Further similarities between 
these two paradigms need not be 
pursued here but, given such a 
comparison, what happens to the 
purported connection with Foucault? 
We suggest that any connection 
remains supcrlicial at best, and that 
much remains to be done if such 
connections are to be expanded, or 
made more crdible. Given that the 
tactic in this section has been, in part, 
to associate discourse analysis with 
Radical Behaviourism, thus placing a 
greater distance between discourse 
analysis and Foucault, one final point 
needs to be made concerning the other 
connection this triad: Foucault couu 
not be considered as a behaviourist 
because his work does not contribute 
directly to an account of contemporary 
behaviour; historical work does not 
bear a direct relation to behaviour 
beyond the tad; understanding events 
in his terms does not entail that it 
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should have predictive power. So, 
while Foucault does not give accounts 
in which an active, reflective agent is 
present, his work should not be 
described as having any significant 
relationship with behaviouristic 
psychology. 
We have characterised 
discourse analysis, then, as an attempt 
to celebrate language use as that which 
is the most hrrdamental aspect of being 
human. However, it fails to move 
much beyond this celebration, 
preferring the comfort of its own 
assumed intellectual ‘bettemess’ and 
‘modernness’. It is a project without a 
rigorous method (we are unsure how 
discourse analysts’ accounts of what 
lies behind language use can be 
distinguished from common sense, off- 
the-cuff remarks), and with only the 
most tenuous grasp of the philosophical 
themes claimed as legitimating its 
practices. It is a political project in the 
sense that it wishes to install ‘language’ 
as the ultimate explanatory category, 
and it seeks to enlist the services of 
Foucault to this end. Foucault is being 
used here as little more than a source of 
moral authority: his archaeological 
method is not followed rigorously by 
discourse analysts in psychology. 
Foucault’s own work would resist 
discourse analysis, if his method were 
ever rigorously employed. 
Concluding remarks 
It took fifteen years to 
convert my book about 
madness into a slogan: all 
mad people were confined in 
the eighteenth century. But it 
did not even take fifteen 
months - it only took three 
weeks - to convert my book 
on will to knowledge into the 
slogan ‘Sexuality has never 
been repressed‘. (Foucault 
1983: 211). 
Towards the end of his life, 
Foucault complained about bookshops 
piled up with hastily written books 
which “with lies and pronunciation 
mistakes, say anything and evetything 
about the history of the world ever 
since its foundation, or which rewrite 
more recent histories with slogans and 
clichds.” (Foucault 1985: 76; 
translation from Macey 1993: 426). 
Foucault’s work has not been immune 
from this process of rewriting; indeed, 
we have argued that he has served as a 
kind of moral authority for some books 
which we guess he would not have 
regarded very highly. Why is this a 
problem? 
We have risked accusations of 
policing the uses to which Foucaqlt 
may be put. Yet we maintain that the 
use of Foucault as a legitimating 
device, a source of moral authority, is 
unacceptable. We have suggested that 
certain discourse analysts claim 
Foucault as a founding father, but then 
forget the necessity of having a 
rigorous method, particularly one 
sensitive to historical processes. But 
Discourse Analysts are not alone in 
their abuse of Foucault - the problem is 
fairly wide spread in many area. 
Foucault has been enlisted by many 
scholars to aid their various theisms; 
but Foucault’s work is more 
appropriate for intellectual atheists. 
Many scholars have, however, 
produced accounts which seem to fit in 
with our Pyrrhonian view of Foucault, 
and have followed his injunction to 
‘produce genealogies’; that is, they 
have written accounts which give us 
histories of present problematics. In 
Australia, genealogies of education 
have sought to use Foucault’s method 
to outline the conditions under which 
modern deployments of educational 
techniques have emerged, and have 
allowed us the possibility of viewing 
education in a new way. Hunter’s 
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(1989) amount of the ‘invention’ of the 
aesthetic citizen allow us to understand 
the realm of personal experience as one 
which is neither hndamentally 
individualistic nor one which is the 
simple imposition of a dominant 
ideology. Hunter is able to demolish 
the arguments of those for whom 
education is either class control or a 
victory for enlightenment thinking; he is 
able to do this precisely because he 
makes use of history. The nineteenth- 
century educational reforms of David 
Stow are crucial for Hunter in terms of 
the construction of our modern 
practices; and it is through his analyxis 
of Stow that Hunter points out where 
most theorists of education go wrong: 
[they] assume that education is a 
manifestation of culture, pictured as 
the historical reconciliation of an 
exemphy opposition between the 
self-realising and the utilitarian, the 
self-expressive and the normative. 
They disagree only over whether this 
universal movement towards the 
complete development of human 
capacities has already occurred or 
has been blocked by a eeezing of the 
dialetic on the side of ‘class cultural 
control’. However, it seems to be 
the case that self-realisation and 
social noms, self-discovery and 
moral trainin& are by no means 
opposed to each other in Stow’s 
modified version of the pedagogical 
disciplines. Quite the opposite: it 
was in the supervised freedom of the 
playground that moral norms would 
be realised through self-expressive 
techniques; and it was in this space 
that the forms of self-discovery 
organised around the individual 
wouldpermit the realisation of new 
social norms at the level of the 
population. 
(Hunter 1989: 38-9; italics in 
original). 
Hunter’s counter-intuitive 
conclusion arises precisely because he 
takes Foucault seriously: he is a 
genealogist of education. More 
examples of this tendency in Australian 
education studies can be seen in 
McCallum (1991) and the special 
‘Foucaultian’ issue of History of 
Education Review. Both these 
publications seem to us to be worth 
some consideration because they use 
Foucault - they do not simply attempt 
to legitimate themselves by reference to 
his method. 
Similarly, Rose’s (1985, 1990, 
1996) amounts of the self-actualising 
citizen produced primarily through 
psychological and educational 
discourses is successfi~I, we argue, 
because it obeys our injunction and 
uses Foucault. B6jiin’s (1985) 
genealogy of orgasmotherapy is 
another attempt to use Foucault’s 
methods in the field of sexuality, as is 
Hacking’s (1990) ~ccount of the ever- 
increasing importance of statistics as 
tool €or mastering a world that 
appeared to be becoming more and 
more indeterministic. 
In an interview concerning his 
use of Nietzsche, Foucault commented: 
The only valid tribute to thought 
such as Nietzwhe’s is precisely to 
use it, to deform it, to make it 
groan and protest. And if 
commentators then say that I am 
being or unfaithful to 
Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no 
interest. 
(Foucault 1977~). 
We do not object to scholars who 
‘deform’ Foucault; but our argument is 
that the certain uses of Foucault are 
unhelpll. We r e a h  our suggestion 
that the notion of ‘use’ be taken 
seriously, and not just to reduce his 
work to a slogan; some of the scholars 
we have discussed in this paper have 
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not taken up the challenge of using 
Foucault. 
We wish to thank the following for 
their comments on earlier drafi of ihis 
paper: IanBishp, Susan Condor, 
A h  Collins, Douglas Fraser. Mike 
Michael, Mary Smyth. Gordon Tait 
and Gary Wickham. 
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